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Today, individuals, governments, and companies are increasingly relying on technology; 
this consequently raises a whole new set of technology-related challenges for regulators 
and policy-makers. In particular, the new developments and problems posed by 
electronic identity and personal identity management are taking on an ever more 
important role. While the importance of identity management systems solutions is widely 
understood, relatively little has been written on the accompanying regulatory and legal 
aspects of electronic identity. This is so despite the fact that members of the European 
Parliament,1 the Council of Europe and EU Commissioners Reding and Kuneva have 
repeatedly expressed concern over the negative consequences of these developments2. 
This white paper thus addresses questions relating to the main challenges in the legal 
sphere, and what policy-makers could do to address these challenges by various legal 
means and instruments. The focus is on the regulatory and legal issues, not technical 
ones, as these have been addressed in detail in other for a, such as the recent identity 
management primer by OECD3. The white paper was born as a result of an electronic 
identity and law workshop in Brussels on 15 May, 20094. It is a systematic extension of 
the workshop discussions and represents a seminal research paper on electronic 
identity and law.  
The questions addressed in the paper are: 
• What evidence exists on important trends and drivers? 
• What, if any, are the main regulatory challenges? 
• What tools (institutions, regulations, etc.) are available? 
• Is a rethinking of the current regulatory framework necessary?   
The white paper provides a starting point for a wide reflection on the current, sparse 
regulatory framework. While it, intentionally, falls well short of proposing an integrated, 
Community regulation of identity, it identifies in depth the gaps in the current regulatory 
framework and explores the relative merits of a coordinated approach to the regulation 
of identity in the digital age, an approach that speaks directly to the policy agendas 
mentioned. It is a first step in raising consensus on the need to study how the role and 
characteristics of identity are changing, and how these changes are taking place in the 
digital domain. 
                                                 
1  EP Press Release. MEPs Call for Stricter Legislation to Protect Citizens from the Effects of Profiling. 
Justice and Home Affairs, 24.04.2009. Also see Sarah Ludford, Report with a Proposal for a European 
Parliament Recommendation to the Council on the Problem of Profiling, Notably on the Basis of 
Ethnicity and Race, in Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, Immigration, Customs and Border Control 
(2008/2020(Ini)) (Strasbourg: EP Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2009). 
2  Viviane Reding, Citizens' Privacy Must Become Priority in Digital Age, Says Eu Commissioner 
Reding (Brussels, 14 April 2009: EC DG Information Society and Media, 2009), Meglena Kuneva, 
Keynote Speech at Roundtable on Online Data Collection, Targeting and Profiling (Brussels, 31 March 
2009: Roundtable on Online Data Collection, Targeting and Profiling 2009). 
3  OECD, The Role of Digital Identity Management in the Internet Economy: A Primer for 
Policymakers, 2009, Available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/48/43091476.pdf. 
4  Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. Workshop on Regulatory and 
Legal Aspects of Electronic Identity. Directorate General, Information Society and Media, Brussels, 
Belgium, May 15, 2009. Workshop minutes on the Internet forthcoming. 
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2. TRANSITION AND ITS POLICY RELEVANCE 
As the availability of digital content and distribution over digital infrastructure increases, 
the idea of digital living is being enabled. This means that we will need be using a mix of 
appropriately transformed old services as well as a set of new virtual services and 
applications. As part of this development, identification, authentication, authorisation 
(IAA), and access to services need to be managed ever more strenuously to ensure 
trusted access to both public and private applications. However, at the moment there is 
no universally accepted Internet identity infrastructure available to handle identification, 
authentication, authorisation online5  (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.  On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog6.  
Nevertheless, during the last 20 years of Internet operation a certain level of trust has 
been created, at least in some realms, such as electronic banking where banks have set 
up their own trusted identity infrastructure using for instance tokens and special devices. 
As a result we have a plethora of sector specific solutions (based on e.g. SSL 
encryption, PIN, tokens) and e-services (e.g. PKI infrastructure with either strong or 
weak authentication). Problems culminate with these varying levels of assurance and 
protection, as the use of advanced Internet services becomes widespread. 
There is an increasing awareness among policy makers and legislators that digital 
identities  are vital to the way Internet services are provided and to citizens' everyday life 
(e.g with regard to digital living and advanced eServices). It is recognized that the same 
personal data that are used to enable access to services transforms into digital traces 
and the increasing linking of EU citizens' personal data to their online and offline 
activities raises a new set of issues concerning human rights, fairness and 
discrimination, competitiveness and competition, and digital market integration. There 
are concerns about the stepping over European citizens' human rights, including privacy 
and mobility, in an ever expanding surveillance society, perpetrated by business7 and 
                                                 
5 Commonly, people refer to this as 'on the internet nobody knows who you are', but this is conflating 
the issues, because often it does not matter who you are, but rather you're entitlement to some service 
matters. For instance, for some services one needs to be of age. It would be sufficient to assess that the 
claim that you are of age is true. This is not possible in many jurisdictions without revealing much 
more identity data. Also proving one's name (as a shorthand for one's identity) is not possible in many 
jurisdictions.  
6  Peter Steiner, New Yorker, Condé Nast Publications, July 5, 1993. 
7  MEP Stavros Lambrinidis, Report with a Proposal for a European Parliament Recommendation to the 
Council on Strengthening Security and Fundamental Freedoms on the Internet (2008/2160(Ini)) 
(Strasbourg: EP Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2009). 
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public authorities alike.8 There are concerns about the potential impact of online data 
collection, targeting and profiling on consumers, including impacts on privacy, measured 
against the desire to foster the take up of advanced digital services by EU citizens.9 
Moreover, further issues arise concerning the consequences of the Internet of Things, 
IPv6 and cloud computing for personal data disclosure, storage and control. 
  
(Personal) identity data, considered as an enabler of the digital economy, is likely to 
become a key component of DG Information Society and the Media new Commissioner 
and portfolio.10 Policy makers have a crucial role to play in setting the framework 
conditions so as to sustain this shift while maximising the benefits for economy and 
society.11 But also there is consensus that only when European citizens will be aware of, 
understand and fully enjoy the 'digital rights' granted to them by current EU regulations, 
will consumer confidence and the single market for businesses blossom, hence fulfilling 
the promise of the European digital market.12 
3. EMERGING TRENDS 
At the moment, many of the building blocks for new identity infrastructures are already in 
place. The technology and systems in use are reasonably developed, and the existing 
practices and regulatory framework (i.e. telecommunications, e-privacy, e-signatures, 
data protection directives, the EU internal market, and consumer protection legislation) 
enable the further development of electronic identity infrastructures. In the mobile 
sphere, identification mechanisms have already been established and work relatively 
well13. We can also see a new trend from circles of trust to open systems14. 
From this background, we can foresee the growth in the use of several different forms of 
electronic identity. Even today there is widespread use of eGovernment, eHealth, and 
eLearning applications. Furthermore, identity management systems are continuously 
improving, and activities towards further standards and agreements (cross-border and 
cross-sector) are being developed and utilised. Some infrastructure for integrated 
electronic identity infrastructures has already appeared, which allows for a better 
balance between more accountability and more anonymity in online transactions15. 
Another trend is the increased profiling activities, both for profit (mainly in the case of 
private businesses) and for security (mainly in the case of governments). However, it is 
                                                 
8  Ross Anderson, Ian Brown, Terri Dowty, William Heath, Philip Inglesant and Angela Sasse, Database 
State (York: The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust Ltd., 2009), Ludford, Report with a Proposal for a 
European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on the Problem of Profiling, Notably on the 
Basis of Ethnicity and Race, in Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, Immigration, Customs and Border 
Control (2008/2020(Ini)). 
9  Meglena Kuneva, Key Challenges for Consumer Policy in the Digital Age (London, 20 June 2008: 
Roundtable on Digital Issues, 2008). 
10  Euractive, Reding Makes Plans for New Commission Term, 23 June 2009, InfoSociety News, 
Euractive, Available: http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/reding-plans-new-commission-
term/article-183406, 29 June 2009. 
11  Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Future Networks and the Internet (Brussels: 
Council of the European Union, 2008). 
12  European Commission, Consumer Rights: Commission Wants Consumers to Surf the Web without 
Borders  (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2009). 
13  See for example: Günter Müller and Sven Wohlgemuth, Study on Mobile Identity Management 
(Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany: FIDIS Network, 2005). 
14  Eve Maler and Drummond Reed, "The Venn of Identity: Options and Issues in Federated Identity 
Management," IEEE Security & Privacy 2008. 
15  Stuart Short, Slim Trabelsi, Andrea Rota and Michele Bezzi, "An Architecture for Privacy Policy 
Composition," Research paper produced as part of FP7 program PrimeLife  (2008). 
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not always clear what the benefits to the citizens may be. Various kinds of profiling 
models (advertising business model, crime detection, compliance with rules, health 
monitoring) present new problems in terms of privacy and data protection. Social 
networking sites (SNSs), where citizens profile themselves for fun and bonding with 
others, also create new challenges for social transactions, because citizen reputations 
(online and consequently offline) are at stake16. 
Emerging technologies exacerbate the complexity of identity-related issues. 
Technologies such as cloud computing and Internet of Things create new objects 
related to people and hence new profiling possibilities. Mobility presents yet another 
challenge, in this case for location-based profiling. 
Overall, identity-related issues remain the same as in the past but many more 
parameters have to be considered. The most important of these are accountability, 
anonymity, technological robustness, legal liability, and their various implications. In 
general, the trends seem to point to the direction of user-chosen identities increasing in 
importance, and government-allocated ones decreasing (I am not sure since e-ID might 
be as regards at least transactional operations be viewed as more secure and as they 
are moreless gratuitously delivered quite interesting for people. Other problem the 
difficulty for people to manage a variety of different electronic keys. As I suggested the 
question of competition between private electronic signatures and official ones must be 
underlined)   
4. CURRENT CHALLENGES IN REGULATORY AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC 
IDENTITY 
In this white paper, we have identified and categorised the current challenges for the 
use of electronic identity into three clusters. These are the definitions-related 
challenges, identity rights related challenges, and the ones arising from the 
developments in the electronic identity industry. We will look at each of these in turn. 
Definitions 
One key issue regarding the legal aspects of electronic identity is its provider. 
Traditionally, identity and thus electronic identity have been and are state-allocated. In 
the last few years we have also seen the emergence of user-chosen identity (but 
mediated by the industry)17. The former can be referred to as eID, the latter as eId. In 
addition to this basic division, there is a need for a further definition and clarification of 
terms. Some  key concepts are: identity, electronic identity, identifier, and partial identity.  
A major threat in the future will come from identity being linked to objects, raising new 
issues concerning what is personal data, and what is personal identity data18 (Internet of 
things as a challenge).  
 
Historically, identity has been in the background, which raises uncertainties about its 
legal role in a transactional context19, but as a result of technological development, 
                                                 
16  Anders Albrechtslund, "Online Social Networking as Participatory Surveillance," First Monday 13.3 
(2008). 
17  Thierry Nabeth, "Identity of Identity," The Future of Identity in the Information Society: Challenges 
and Opportunities, eds. Kai Rannenberg, Denis Royer and André Deuker (Springer, 2009). 
18  Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, 01248/07/En, Wp 136 
(Brussels: 2007). 
Commentaire [YP17] : I don’t 
see the link between the two 
sentences. 
Commentaire [YP18] : What 
do you mean?  
Commentaire [Ronald Le19] 
 am not entirely clear what 
these issues are at this point. 
Commentaire [Ronald Le20] 
his is not substantiated by the 
preceding text but comes later.  
Commentaire [YP21] : I have 
really difficulties to see the logic 
existing between  the different 
points analysed in that Point 4.   
Commentaire [YP22] : I 
prefer to use the term “Categories” 
and to have  a presentation 
following different criteria: the 
provider, the nature of the 
identified thing (person vs Object), 
the way by which persons are 
identified (name, serial number, 
body), the purpose of the identifier 
(traceability, authentication, …). 
Apart from these distinction we 
must have  a grid presenting the 
peculiar issues of each of these 
types of identifiers  
Commentaire [YP23] : We 
must refine these first distinction. 
The distinction is not only between 
identifier imposed by the state or 
chosen by the users. You have also 
digital identifiers imposed by 
companies. Additionally we must 
envisage biometric identifier apart 
from other identity linked to 
individuals.   
Commentaire [Ronald Le24] 
 agree with Ian that this is a 
novel way of distinguishing the 
two types of eid's. But why not. 
Commentaire [Ronald Le25] 
hy are these problematic 
concepts 
Supprimé : : s
Supprimé : problematic
Supprimé : of this type include
Supprimé : s
Supprimé : ies
Commentaire [YP26] : At my 
opinion cookie is an identifier 
Why not discuss about this kind of 
identifier?  
Commentaire [YP27R26] :  
Commentaire [Ronald Le28] 
ithout reading Sullivan, I have 
no clue what you mean by this. ... [1]
 
 
identity and its use context will become ever more significant. In addition, it can be 
dangerous to define identity in abstract terms, without being specific about its practical 
consequences, given that different rules apply in different contexts and businesses, as 
well as being different in the private and public sectors. 
Apart from the lack of generally accepted terminology, there is no common language in 
different contexts and businesses. A common language is necessary to reach a shared 
understanding of the issues and the equal development of identity infrastructures in 
different sectors. The problem is compounded by policy-makers' in general not being 
prepared to tackle the issue, since most policy-makers of today are not well versed in 
web and identity related issues.  
Identity Rights 
There is evidence that, while with traditional service provision the requirement for 
identification lies with the provider, with the Internet it is the user that requires to access 
a service (most likely offered by another user who does not consider becoming a service 
provider) and thus it is the user that requires being authenticated. This leads to two 
different understandings of identity rights (if any such rights are thought to exist 
independently). These are, firstly, the right to be identified (with accurate identity 
information available when and where required, and on the other hand the limits of 
identification: privacy and data protection), and secondly, the right of one person's 
identity not to be misrepresented20. The second issue is more complex to deal with, and 
also a relatively new one, having emerged to such an extent as a result of the extremely 
fast developments in personal identity. On the other hand, the claim of the existence of 
an underlying right to identity is far more complex for data that is not controlled by the 
individual (e.g. by governments and companies) and that is not unique (proliferation). 
The correct representation (contextual integrity) of the data, based on autonomy, may 
be the underlying principle in both circumstances.  
Anonymity (or/and pseudonimity?), an underlying principle of privacy, has long been 
recognised as a social value. Even though data minimisation is important, we must go 
beyond: more possibilities for anonymous transactions, for transactions using a 
pseudonym or concluded through a third party anomyser must become available than 
there currently are. On the one hand, we need mandatory mechanisms that allow 
'switching off' identity. On the other hand, the increasing intrusion invites regulatory 
action concerning companies' value propositions, which need to be transparent and 
whose benefits should be clearly stated and measurable. This should be acceptable for 
businesses, as the guiding principle for their activities is what we want, not who we are. 
Therefore the key principles here are opacity of information and transparency of 
transaction. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to discuss which identity is used in which situation: for 
example, private/public might be one useful distinction. Electronic identity also means 
different things in different use cases: for healthcare, social networking sites, and 
business transactions, to give just a few examples, the characteristics of and 
requirements for electronic identity are very different. A related point is that the data 
provided by individuals may be considered the personal property of the individual, at 
least in cases where the data is personal and specific to the person providing it. 
                                                                                                                                                 
19  Claire Sullivan. Digital Identity – The Legal Person? Computer Law & Security Review, Volume 25, 
Issue 3, 2009, pages 227-236. 
20  The need for strong identity legislation has been emphasized, among others, by the EU Commissioner 
for Human Rights: Hammarberg, T. Strong data protection rules are needed to prevent the emergence 
of a surveillance society. Strasbourg, 2008, Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights. 
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However, there are alternative cases such as the health sector, where the data are not 
known or understood by users well enough to be given control over them. 
A common view today is that user-chosen identity (eId) will drive the government-
provided identity (eID). The rationale behind this argument is that however much data 
governments hold does not matter: instead, what matters is the way the data is used 
(i.e. according to OECD principles21). A real danger is posed by the fact that due to 
information technologies, profiling not only is possible, but becomes easy and can be 
automated22; this leads to profiles that are generated and used without citizens' 
knowledge23. Generally speaking, it is unclear what are the benefits for the citizens of 
increased surveillance; there is limited evidence of the impact of these technologies on 
security (especially in the case of national security, as profiling is not a reliable method 
for predicting rare events), but also in other fields, the impact of increased surveillance 
needs to be assessed24. Surveillance activities always involve economic trade-offs; 
these need to be monetised and economically modelled to make informed decisions. 
In addition, the proliferation of eId means a significant burden on the information 
handling capabilities of governments, a burden they in general find difficult to handle. 
Some common problems are the economic restraints faced by governments and the 
occasional security issues25 with government databases. Indeed, in many situations 
auditing controls may be useful or even necessary. The economic and security-related 
problems seem to indicate that a major part of the development of electronic identity 
would have to take place outside of government systems (in terms of quantity of 
developments, not in terms of their absolute value, since the crucial identity 
management systems will still have to be provided by governments). Moreover, states 
are not only controlling citizens, as government behaviour may spread into business; but 
then, through its purchasing power and through demand side regulation, the state at 
least has the capacity to dictate de facto standards in relation to personal data handling 
(and setting a moral precedent based on the following argument: we have more data 
than we need, but we will use them appropriately).  
Finally, according to the OECD primer for policy-makers, there are four main challenges 
in terms of ensuring user privacy: (i) issues regarding the long-term safe storage and 
appropriate usage of personal information, and eliminating identity-related personal 
information when it is no longer needed; (ii) since the greater availability of credentials 
from high-level assurance systems could increase their use in systems with lower-level 
assurance needs, there could be an increased risk for personal data; (iii) the identity 
systems that facilitate anonymity and pseudonymity may raise new issues with regard to 
who has the right to decide which data should be veiled and when it can be unveiled; (iv) 
the fact that differences may arise as to which practices of identity and data collection, 
                                                 
21  OECD, Oecd Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2009, 
Available: http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
22  Hildebrandt M, Gutwirth S. (eds.) Profiling the European citizen. Cross disciplinary perspectives, 
page 373, Springer Science, 2008. 
23  Serge Gutwirth. Beyond Identity? Identity in the Information Society, Issue 1, 2009.. 
24  Mark Andrejevic, "The Work of Watching One Another: Lateral Surveillance, Risk, and 
Governance," Surveillance & Society 2.4 (2005). 
25  Adrie van der Luijt, Audit Chiefs Still Lax on Data Privacy, 26 June 2008, Online article, Director of 
Finance Online, Available: http://www.dofonline.co.uk/governance/audit-chiefs-still-lax-on-data-
privacy6637.html, 24 July 2008. 
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use, and retention can be left to market forces and which should be subject to 
government intervention.26 
Developments in the Electronic Identity Industry 
An ever more important issue in the eId industry is the increasing monopolies that are 
outside the control of a single eId market regulation. In this context, there is a need 
for the European Commission to ensure that EU institutions and member states (MS) 
are dealing with citizens' data correctly and transparently, as the most important 
regulating bodies, supported by regional and local authorities. Lately some companies 
have begun making the same argument (data availability does not matter); but there are 
questions as to whether businesses get the same level of scrutiny as governments do, 
and whether the data protection processes of all businesses are scrutinised equally. It 
should be kept in mind that collecting consumer information for business purposes and 
respecting their privacy can be competing goals27.  
Another problem related to the relationship between governments and business is that 
there may be collusive behaviours between governments and companies on the 
covert release of citizens' data (sometimes, as in the US, for money); this creates an 
economy of personal data which poses significant dangers in terms of erosion of 
privacy. The kind of citizen data that may be at risk due to its business relevance 
includes passenger travel records, accommodation records or SWIFT data for financial 
transfers. Rules that openly oversee such transactions would work best. There should 
be in-built guarantees that the data will be used responsibly, e.g. via state control, or 
through the user being able to decide how his data will be used. However, there is still a 
need for a debate on who is best placed to govern the overseeing of the implementation, 
and whether the supervising authority should be the same or a different actor in different 
contexts. Finally, the companies should also have economic incentives28, apart from 
moral ones, to act responsibly. 
A yet another industry-related challenge relates to infomediaries including web 2.0 
platforms: private gatekeepers (such as the ISPs, Google, Facebook) of people's 
personal data that have a significant degree of control eating into areas which were 
previously opaque (such as the case of nominal e-ticketing, in which identity tags are 
attached to transactions that were previously anonymous). These gatekeepers have an 
overview of how you act with different companies and Internet sites and in different 
contexts. There should be adequate legislation in place to deal with the increasing role 
of infomediaries and to ensure data protection in their operations.  
We can identify four different sets of problems in relation to infomediaries: (i) they do 
more than the collection of digital traces, collecting data from different sources, and 
there is little transparency over their current or future use which can create monopolistic 
attitudes; (ii) this in turn creates issues of trust and a need for a behavioural assessment 
of the user, as well as a need to evaluate benefits to consumers and society; (iii) it adds 
implications for responsibility and accountability, and provokes a re-thinking of economic 
incentives; (iv) it raises issues in relation to supervision and control, governance, soft 
regulation and benchmarking of company activities. 
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In addition to the direct challenges to identity law and regulation discussed above, there 
are also indirect challenges. Most importantly, identity (as implemented in today's eID 
and eId systems) is necessarily linked to trust and societal acceptance, since we have 
no way to know whether people are misusing our personal data, which we voluntarily 
supply to access a given service. In general, there is very limited if any societal 
discussion on these topics, with the exception of a few countries, and definitely not at 
EU level. On a societal level, there is a strong need to link whatever implementation of 
eID and eId to measures of benefits for citizens and society. There is thus a need to do 
impact assessment: are citizens trading their personal data? In exchange for what? 
Under what assumptions? As a concrete example, it can be argued that data collection 
could be justified by the added public security, but in the UK the courts have not 
accepted this argument. 
Technologies like web2.0, SOA with Web3.0, Internet of Things, cloud computing, IPv6, 
and location based services will also generate further challenges to the existing 
framework. They further increase data maximisation vs. minimisation, confer systems 
ways to identifying people, reduce possibilities for non-nominative transactions, link 
identity to objects and create further data fragmentation (which may then be data-
mined). These growing tensions also apply to other 'identity' principles, such as purpose 
and unlinkability, which become more complex to manage in such environments.  
Finally, not everything revolves around data protection, as consumer protection and 
social discrimination are significant components to consider in the regulatory 
discussion (where not only personal data at stake: the benefits and consequences of 
data protection in these contexts are equally important, if not more so). 
5. TOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS 
Even today, we already have various tools and institutions available to deal with the new 
requirements for identity management. The existing legislation is already extensive and 
provides many tools for tackling the challenges, but there are still problems due to a lack 
of standard implementation. In this context, there are many difficulties related to the 
inefficiency of data protection supervision (the relatively passive involvement across the 
EU, the limited powers of the Article 29 Working Party, and the differences in how 
proactive the national data protection authorities are), the inexistence of a single market 
for eId (because of differences in legislation across member states), and great disparity 
in national implementation of identity-related legislation, across members states and 
sectors (possibly even more disparity than has been previously argued, though some 
information exchange takes place, for example, in the legal system29). Almost nothing is 
known, for instance, about data protection across national borders (in the form of 
comparative studies or similar). Currently, data protection works under EU first pillar, 
which concentrates on consumer protection and market integration. At the moment data 
protection is processed differently under EU pillar three (security and defence, including 
protection from terrorist activities), though a similar processing under this pillar would be 
highly relevant. [more on this in the final version of the paper]  
The biggest implementation-related issue is the compliance of member states and 
companies with existing principles enshrined in the current legislation. Therefore, 
compliance with the law and its enforcement by data protection authorities is a key step 
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to be taken, the need for the enforcement being made increasingly visible by 
technological developments. At the moment, most member states have implemented the 
e-signatures Directive in their legislation30, which is an important step towards 
standardized legal environment. This facilitates  legal interoperability regarding a 
building block for electronic identities31. A complementary issue is the interoperability of 
identity solutions across contexts and/or national boundaries (which we call business 
interoperability): it may become an issue if the technological implementations are too 
specific or too tailored to the needs of a particular country or situation, as argued in the 
report quoted by Hayat et al32.  
The main issue, then, is the application of the principles (self-induced, regulatory, 
technological) underlying different pieces of legislation33, as even the systems being 
considered and designed today clearly do not conform to them. The most important of 
these principles are minimisation: use and collection of the minimum personal data 
necessary to complete a transaction; proportionality: the maxim that no action should be 
taken which exceeds the demands of the situation in question; and unlinkability: 
ensuring that two pieces of unrelated personal data cannot be linked to each other by 
any actors. For instance, personal data centralisation and fragmentation are both a 
problem and a solution; there is a need to find a balance between identity efficiency and 
protection in scalability. The 'privacy by design' approach (one where identity protection 
measures are built into the systems from the start) is a possible solution in this 
respect34.  
The current tools at our disposal also include the more specific compliance-inducing 
regulations, such as drafting of industry Codes of Conduct35 (for specific fields) to 
create a level playing field and for risk management, again needing support and 
approval from consumers (e.g. recent RFID recommendation); support for elaboration of 
standards (regulatory: W3C, pling, etc); and enforcement of EU regulation towards 
members states (infringement procedure). All these solutions point to a need for a more 
focused EU legislation addressing the 'grey' area surrounding the implementation of 
existing regulations (industry, member states). The latter item can be seen as a tried 
and tested and well understood way of ensuring member state activity in a given field, 
and as such relatively easy to implement. 
One possible solution is embedding the principles directly in the new architectures to 
come. In this respect, an important problem is personal data fragmentation; 
fragmentation is both a resource (if it enables privacy and enables identities that are 
limited to a specific use) and a challenge (as it may create market dynamics of oligopoly 
on people's identity and de facto standards). This is related to the issue of centralisation 
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vs. decentralisation36: we generally assume that decentralisation is better (safer, more 
efficient, etc.), for example due to a smaller likelihood of the system being abused later 
on if there are several different stakeholders, but this is not necessarily the case in 
practice. 
If we then move to a more general view of the legislation, most of the existing legislation 
does not deal with identity per se, but this is not true if we move down to specific 
applications and fields37. Therefore stating the need for a reform of the regulatory 
framework may be dangerous: this needs time to reach down, it is counterproductive to 
constantly modify and criticise current regulation, and technological neutrality is 
necessary. What may be required is a sort of translational legal science, whereby 
abstract principles are made more understandable in practice by integrating 
perspectives, and possible solutions, from other domains (see an example of how this 
can be done from the medical domain).38 In the case of eId, this would imply looking at 
cryptography on the one hand and at value embedded design on the other hand (as an 
example of the translational paradigm of combining different perspectives). In this 
context, privacy by design and 'Code'39 as code, as a technological choice would be a 
very valuable regulatory tool. 
6. POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES TO CURRENT CHALLENGES 
This section addresses the following questions: 
• What – if any – are the solutions? What is the (likely) impact of these 
solutions? How difficult would it be to implement them?   
• Who are the stakeholders involved? What should they do? 
Possibly the most important policy action, as discussed in the previous chapter, is the 
enforcement of current legislation. The legislation already offers substantial 
possibilities for data protection and the regulation of personal data management issues. 
What remains to be done is to ensure that all current business and government 
practices in this area conform to the law as it is, and that there are no loopholes in the 
legislation being exploited. The European Data Protection Commissioner has a 
significant role to play in this; for details, see e.g. Hustinx (2004)40. 
Another very important issue is the layering of regulation on eId in the data protection 
directives (DPD) of specific fields such as health. In these cases, specific legislation and 
regulation is deployed on top of general provisions. On the one hand, this runs counter 
to attempts at systematisation, but on the other hand, it could provide a good rationale 
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for understanding which issues are specific to each field and which is shared between 
different sectors. 
The role of the EC and EU as a large client for many companies in the eId industry 
should also be considered. Based on this, the Commission could exert significant 
regulation on privacy and data protection via its buying power (i.e., only buy into the 
best standards). The EC could also persuade the member states to act likewise at the 
procurement stage of eId. 
Also, it should be kept in mind that 'identity', electronic or otherwise, is not Community 
Law. Identity can be discussed (and has been discussed: see e.g. Sullivan 200841) 
under different headings to address the issues (the Commission has pushed in this 
direction several times, e.g.  the eServices card); this is problematic, unless Community 
Law is changed.  
The policy option that would possibly have the largest impact, though not the easiest 
feasibility, is societal discussion and acceptance of identity implementation; a 
democratic process of acceptance that is almost unanimously seen as legitimising eId in 
Europe. This has more to do with the active involvement of citizenship in the 
understanding and definition of personal data, privacy, and user control, than with 
education and awareness raising. The citizens must be empowered to manage their 
own digital identities appropriately and with means suitable to various situations. If the 
impacts of new identity implementations on the citizen are neglected, we will most likely 
end up with unsuitable solutions or with a low rate of acceptance. 
Another area of policy options is formed by soft legal-technical regulatory solutions, 
based on Best Available Techniques for identity: anonymous identity, cryptography, 
DRM, guidelines for compliance, and Commission Recommendations as a suitable tool 
(e.g. on identifiers). These, largely based on soft regulation and persuasion, would offer 
a good balance between impact and chances of implementation at the present time. 
These include solutions that keep personal data separate, allowing data control on 
behalf of citizens, rather than by citizens (which could carry problems, due to increasing 
responsibility in case of lack of skills).  
However, best available techniques (BATs) need to be seen as clearly linked to 
compliance; therefore not BATs in general, but BATs that generate compliance with 
specific eId regulation. In this context, the behavioural issues regarding the acceptance 
of different types of soft solutions should be analysed. Standardisation solutions, not 
necessarily EU level, (technical: privacy seals, ISO for IDMS) are often held to have a 
lower impact than other types of policy actions: this identifies a need for a debate on 
what the aims and benefits of standardisation (legal, technical) are in the field of eId. 
In Annex 1, we provide some more specific policy actions that the European 
Commission and the member states could take, based on a list compiled in the 
Electronic Identity and Law workshop held in Brussels on May 15, 2009. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
[to be written when the paper has been completed] 
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ANNEX  1. LIST OF POSSIBLE POLICY OPTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC IDENTITY. COMPILED 
IN "ELECTRONIC IDENTITY AND LAW" WORKSHOP, BRUSSELS, MAY 15, 2009. 
a. Enforce EU regulation towards non-EU companies. (With regard to the common 
belief that companies whose home base is outside the EU enjoy a competitive 
advantage because the privacy laws and regulations in their home countries are not 
as strict as in the EU.) 42 
b. Enforce EU regulation towards members states (infringement procedure). (Currently 
member states do not enforce existing regulations with equal efficiency.) 
c. Enforce Article 29 work + opinions (implementation by data protection authorities)43. 
(Article 29 is very valuable work but carries limited regulatory weight.) 
d. Standardise definitions of personal data across EU. (Different definitions make it 
difficult to enforce common regulation.) 
e. Standardise implementation of application of DPD + consumer protection. (Again, 
different approaches and implementations complicate regulation.)44 
f. New supra-national legislation on eId. (EC should take a more active role in 
legislation given that the existing legislation is not sufficient.) 
g. Standardisation solutions, not necessarily EU level (technical: privacy seals, ISO for 
IDMS) (Standards as a tool for creating technical uniformity and facilitating 
regulation.)  
h. eId package relying on existing tools (regulation). (A new collection of laws and 
regulations that together form a package for regulating identity, privacy, and data 
protection issues.)45 
i. eId regulation as infrastructural, like the eSignatures Directive. (A new directive, or 
similar higher-level legislation, that provides technology-neutral legislation on how to 
regulate identity.) 
j. Including identity in Community Law (for parts not related to government activities). 
k. Co-regulation for specific aspects, like SNS for young people (co-regulation between 
the industry and the Commission)46. 
l. Privacy enforcing using ePrivacy Directive art. 14.2 on compliance of terminals 
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m. Best Available Techniques – BATs for identity (anonymous identity, cryptography, 
DRM) 
n. Guidelines for compliance. (Provision of guidelines by the EC to the industry.)  
o. Recommendations as a suitable tool (e.g. identifiers).  
p. Support for elaboration of standards (regulatory: W3C, pling, etc). 
q. Codes of conduct (for specific fields) to create level playing field and for risk 
management; eCommerce Directive: CoC needs support from consumers (e.g. 
RFID recommendation). (The provision of codes of conduct by the industry itself, 
which all companies operating in the EU27 market must fulfil, and the breaching of 
which would lead to some kind of sanctions.) 
r. Societal discussion, social shaping of identity technologies (consultation, consumer 
action, activism mobilising civil society). (As a way of better understanding what 
kind of laws, regulations and underpinning moral standards we want.) 
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